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Abstract
In cryptography we investigate security aspects of data distributed in a network. This kind of security does not protect the
secrecy of the network topology against being discovered if some kind of communication has taken place. But there are several
scenarios where the network topology has to be a part of the secret.
In this paper we study the question of communication within a secret network where the processing nodes of the network have
only partial knowledge (e.g. given as routing tables) of the topology. We introduce a model for measuring the loss of security
of the topology when far distance communication takes place. A communication protocol preserves the secret of topology if no
processing node can deduce additional information about the topology from the communication. We will investigate lower bounds
on the knowledge that can be revealed from the communication string and show, for instance, that some knowledge about distances
can always be revealed. Then, we consider routing tables. We show that several kinds of routing tables are not sufficient to guarantee
the secrecy of topology. On the other hand, if a routing table allows us to specify the direction from which a message is coming,
we can run a protocol solving the all-to-all communication problem such that no processing node can gain additional knowledge
about the network.
Finally, we investigate the problem of whether routing tables can be generated from the local knowledge of the processing nodes
without losing the secrecy of the network topology with respect to the resulting knowledge base. It will be shown that this is not
possible for static networks and most kinds of dynamic networks.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Talking about cryptographic aspects in computer science, one usually thinks about some private data that has to
be kept as a secret. This kind of security does not protect a secret communication network against being discovered
if some kind of communication takes place. But the topology might to be secret itself. Consider, for example, the
situation of a secret agent in the following scenario:
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Fig. 1. Fat Bastard spies on Austin Powers.
The evil secret agent Fat Bastard is spying on Austin Powers. To send his results to Dr Evil he uses a network
of couriers (see Fig. 1) who do not know for whom they are working. To protect the network against attacks of
the intelligence service, every courier only knows a local part of the courier network. Hence, each single attack
only destroys a small part of the network and only gives negligible knowledge about the remaining network.
Furthermore, if a local attack occurs, all neighbors of the attacked courier may disappear. Every courier has
a local instruction set, telling him how to forward a message. To improve efficiency one may want to reduce
the number of messages received by every member of the network. Note that the intelligence service may
get additional knowledge about the topology when analyzing the amount of received messages and the local
instruction set of a courier.
The fact that a courier has restricted access to the network topology is of strategic importance. If the network
is located in a hostile environment, it is necessary to reduce the risk of the couriers from being compromised.
Furthermore, the existence of central entities in the network has to be avoided [22]. We enhance the security of
those networks if the couriers have as little knowledge about the network as possible. If the knowledge about the
network is limited, i.e. it is a subject of privacy, then it will also be a hard task for an enemy to choose where to place
loyal forces to intercept a transmission.
In this paper we focus on the question whether all-to-all communication is possible if we keep the network topology
as a secret.
1.1. Communication and computation in unknown and restricted networks
The interplay of network topology and communication security has been studied extensively over the last decade.
So far, one has examined the effects of restricted networks for secure and private computations and communications
(see e.g. [3,10,11,15,19]). The goal is to compute a function depending on the secret inputs of the network nodes
(called players) such that, after the computation is done, no player knows anything about the secrets of the other
players that cannot be derived from the function value and its own secret. In these papers, the authors investigate the
question whether privacy of data can be preserved if the communication network is restricted. The range of possible
attacks varies between Byzantinean [9] and honest-but-curious attacks [2,8], where the players follow the protocol
precisely but are allowed to ‘gossip’ afterwards.
Depending on the computational power of the players, we distinguish between cryptographically secure privacy
and information theoretically secure privacy. In the first case we assume that no player is able to gain any information
about the input bits of the other players within polynomial time [20,21]. In the second case we do not restrict
the computational power of the players. This notion of privacy (sometimes called unconditional privacy) has been
introduced by Ben-Or et al. [2] and Chaum et al. [8].
In the papers cited so far, the authors assume that the network is fixed and known in advance. The situation
changes when we consider unknown or dynamic networks. This kind of network is investigated if focusing on ad-
hoc networks. The main security attributes that are considered for ad hoc networks are availability (survival against
an attack), confidentiality (hiding sensitive information), integrity (accepted data is not corrupted), authentication,
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and non-repudiation (a message cannot be denied by the sender). However, only confidentiality addresses privacy
concerns [22]. Known protocols that achieve secure communication in an ad hoc network are usually based on
discovering parts of the existing topology at first and using this knowledge to distribute data. Therefore, they are
based on the assumption that the topology is stable for a sufficiently long period of time. If Byzantinean players
may occur, several papers are dedicated to protocols for finding a trusted path from the sender to the receiver [4–6].
Malicious links can be avoided by assigning high costs (respectively weights) to these links. [1].
The papers cited above ignore the aspect that the network topology might be a secret for itself. Focusing on
anonymous communication, one gets some kind of a model that considers the topology as a secret [7,12,16,18]. These
papers study the traffic analysis problem, i.e. the problem of hiding the sender or the receiver of a message or even the
path used for routing a message: Chaum introduces a central entity called mix [7]. In his protocol, a message is first
sent to the mix, which forwards the message to the receiver and clouds the relationship of the sender and the receiver.
Onion routing extends this technique such that proxies in the network establish an anonymous channel between the
sender and the receiver [16,18]. Basically, the sender chooses a delivery path and encodes the path information in
the message. Step by step, the proxies decode the successor in the path and forward the message. The proxies en
route work as distributed mixes of the path. Hence, these solutions of the traffic analysis problem explicitly use given
routing information in the network.
1.2. Our security goal
We focus on the problem of all-to-all communication in an unknown network where the topology is the subject of
secrecy. Therefore, we introduce a model called advised network that combines a communication network and partial
knowledge about it. We present a method for measuring the information gain on the network topology (respively the
loss of network secrecy) when performing a protocol that establishes arbitrary communications between the players.
The model of measuring the information gain is closely related to Shannon’s entropy function [17] and the mutual
information.
Since players which do not know anything about the network— nor even their neighborhood— cannot perform any
kind of useful communication, we assume that some knowledge K of the topology is available to every player. Then,
we will investigate the additional information gain on the network topology G that can be deduced by examining the
communication string C . More precisely, we will investigate the conditional mutual information I (G;C |K). Moving
knowledge about all communication sequences of the protocol into the knowledge base, one can always guarantee
that I (G;C |K) = 0. Therefore, we are also interested in the uncertainty of the topology if the knowledge base is
given, i.e. H(G|K).
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we will formally introduce our model of advised
networks that combines the network topology with partial knowledge. Furthermore, we introduce the network entropy
and the corresponding mutual information as a measure for the amount of information given by the communication
string about the topology. Section 3 is dedicated to the problem of determining necessary conditions of the knowledge
for all-to-all communication. We will show that some knowledge about the distances in the network will always be
revealed during the execution of a protocol solving all-to-all communication. In Section 4 we will analyze knowledge
bases that correspond to routing tables. If the routing table defines a spanning tree of the network, then partial
knowledge of this routing table is sufficient to find a protocol that guarantees I (G;C |K) = 0. In Section 5 we will
investigate the question whether it is possible to construct some kind of routing table-like knowledge base from local
network knowledge like the neighborhood. We will show that this is not possible for static networks. Furthermore, we
will discuss this problem for dynamic networks. We will show that the construction of a sufficient knowledge base
is possible if and only if the players are added to the network node by node. Section 6 will conclude this paper. This
work is based on [13].
2. Preliminaries
G = (V, E) denotes a graph, V are the vertices, and E are the edges of G. For a graph G, the edges of G are given
by E(G) and the vertices by V (G). We refer |V (G)| to be the size of G and Gn to the set of all graphs with n vertices.
A (communication) network is an undirected graph G = (V, E). The edges are called links and the vertices are
called processing nodes (PN for short). The set nbh(Pi ) is called the neighborhood of PN Pi , i.e. the set of all PNs
that have links to Pi .
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A path between two PNs Pi , Pj ∈ V in G is a acyclic subgraph piG(Pi , P j ) with V (piG(Pi , Pj )) =
{v1, v2, . . . , vk}, v1 = Pi , vk = Pj , and E(piG(Pi , Pj )) = {{vi , vi+1} | i ∈ [1, k − 1]} ⊆ E(G). The length of
piG(Pi , Pj ) is the number of links in the path. For easier notation we sometimes identify piG(Pi , Pj ) with its ordered
sequence of PNs.
The networks investigated in this paper are synchronous, i.e. the PNs act in rounds. At the beginning of a round the
PNs may receive messages from their neighbors. Then, internal computations are performed. At the end of a round
the PNs may send messages to their neighbors that are received in the following round. The communication behavior
of the PNs is specified by the protocol that is used. The protocol may be randomized, i.e. each PN has access to a
private random string. Protocols that ignore random strings are called deterministic.
Usually, protocols are based on some knowledge about the underlying network topology. In the following we
assume that a protocol can be executed on every network. To provide the PNs with the knowledge necessary to
execute the protocol on the specific network, we allow the PNs to use a predefined and network-specific data base K.
A PN Pi does not need to have a global view of the network. The data base grants Pi only restricted access to a local
data base Ki ∈ K. More formally, we define:
Definition 1. Let R be the set of all finite subsets of functions. We call R the set of all local data bases. A
mapping T : Gn −→ Rn is called the knowledge base generator. The knowledge base of G is denoted as
K := (K1, . . . ,Kn) = T (G) and Ki is called the knowledge base of PN Pi . The tuple (G,K) is called the
advised network.
W.l.o.g. we assume that for every knowledge base generator there exists a constant κ(T ) such that, for every PN Pi ,
the number functions in Ki for a network of size n is given by κ(T ).
Let Ki be a local knowledge base. We call a function f deducible from Ki if there exists a deterministic algorithm
M with oracle access to the functions in Ki that computes f . Note that f may depend on the network G, whereas M
usually may not have direct access to G.
Definition 2. Let T , T ′ be two knowledge base generators. We call T locally reducible to T ′ (T ≤ T ′ for short) if
there exists an deterministic algorithm M with access to κ(T ′) oracle functions such that for all networks G ∈ Gn ,
for all PNs Pi , for all functions f j ∈ Ki = { f1, . . . , fκ(T )} where K = (K1, . . . ,Kn) = T (G), and for all inputs
x for f j , the function f j can be computed by M on input x and j with oracle queries to functions in K′i where
K′ = (K′1, . . . ,K′n) = T ′(G).
We call T and T ′ equivalent, T ≡ T ′, if T ≤ T ′ and T ′ ≤ T . Let S be a set of knowledge base generators. We
call a knowledge base generator T minimal with respect to S if, for every knowledge base generator T ′ ∈ S that is
reducible to T , it holds that T ≡ T ′. We call a knowledge base K minimal with respect to S for a network G if there
exists a minimal knowledge base generator T w.r.t. S such that T (G) = K.
Note that a local knowledge base Ki may not reveal the whole network to PN Pi . Thus, there may exist several
networks that are consistent withKi belonging to Pi . Hence, an additional information source for Pi about the network
topology is given by the communication sequence when performing a protocol.
Definition 3. Let CP,K,i be the set of all communication sequences Ci seen by Pi using Ki when performing a
protocol P . A communication sequence Ci is a sequence of triples denoting a message, the link (sender, receiver) on
which the message is sent, and the round when it is sent. For Ci , it holds that either the sender or the receiver has to
be Pi .
If P is deterministic, then |CP,K,i | = 1. To address possible networks, we define
G[Ki ] := {G ∈ Gn | ∃K′ : T (G) = K′ = (K′1, . . . ,K′n) and K′i = Ki }.
G[Ki ,Ci ] := {G ∈ Gn | ∃K′ : T (G) = K′ = (K′1, . . . ,K′n) and K′i = Ki and Ci ∈ CP,K′,i }.
G[Ki ] is the set of all networks, whereKi is a possible data base for Pi and G[Ki ,Ci ] represents the possible networks
when Pi additionally sees the communication string Ci . Thus, G[Ki ,Ci ] ⊆ G[Ki ].
The purpose of this paper is to find a knowledge base and a protocol that solves a communication problem such that
no additional knowledge can be obtained by listening to the received messages, i.e. G[Ki ] = G[Ki ,Ci ]. In particular,
we will focus on the all-to-all communication problem (A2A), i.e. for all pairs (Pi , Pj ) ∈ V × V the PN Pi sends
an individual message Mi, j to Pj . After receiving Mi, j , the receiver Pj is able to identify the sender Pi .
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We are interested in the amount of uncertainty of the PNs about the network topology. To measure the uncertainty,
we adapt Shannon’s entropy function [17] and the mutual information that are defined as follows.
Definition 4. For discrete random variables X, Y, Z :
– the probability of x is denoted as
px := P(X = x)
and the conditional probability of x given y is denoted as
px| y := P(X = x|Y = y).
– The entropy of X (respectively the conditional entropy of X given Y ), is defined by
H(X) := −
∑
x
px · log(px )
and
H(X|Y) := −
∑
y
∑
x
py · px |y · log(px |y).
– The conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z is defined by
I (X;Y |Z) := H(X |Z)− H(X |Y, Z).
The following definition and lemmata express a helpful property of the mutual information:
Definition 5. Letting X and Y be two discrete random variables. We say that X dominates Y iff we can partition
the domain of X into subsets X1, . . . , Xk , where k is the cardinality of the domain of Y , and there exists a bijective
function f : dom(Y )→ [1..k] such that Y = y iff x ∈ X f (y).
Lemma 1. Let X, X ′, Y be three random variables, let Z be any condition, and assume that X dominates X ′, then it
holds that
I (X; Y | Z) ≥ I (X ′; Y | Z).
Proof. The claim follows from a well-known property of Shannon’s entropy:
Lemma 2. Letting X, Y be two discrete random variables and let f be an arbitrary function, then it holds that
H(X |Y ) ≤ H(X | f (Y )).
Proof. For completion, we present a proof of this lemma. Note that, for a function f that is injective on the domain
of Y , we get the equality H(X |Y ) = H(X | f (Y )). Hence, we will focus on the case where f is not injective on the
domain of Y . Let Y0, . . . , Yk be a sequence of random variables such that Y0 = Y , Yk = f (Y ), and for all i ∈ [1..k−1]
it holds that the domains of Yi and Yi+1 differ in at most three events, more precisely
1 ≤ |dom(Yi ) \ dom(Yi+1)| ≤ 2 and |dom(Yi+1) \ dom(Yi )| = 1.
We will show that for every i ∈ [1..k − 1] it holds that H(X |Yi ) ≤ H(X |Yi+1). As we have already seen above, this
condition is fulfilled if |dom(Yi ) \ dom(Yi+1)| = 1. Hence, we will investigate the case where this set difference is of
cardinality 2. Let
y1 6= y2 ∈ dom(Yi ) \ dom(Yi+1)
y ∈ dom(Yi+1) \ dom(Yi ).
Then, we have
H(X |Yi )− H(X |Yi+1) = −
∑
x∈X
P[x, y1] · log2
P[x, y1]
P[y1] + P[x, y2] · log2
P[x, y2]
P[y2]
−(P[x, y1] + P[x, y2]) · log2
P[x, y1] + P[x, y2]
P[y1] + P[y2]
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=
∑
x∈X
P[x, y1] · log2
P[y1] · (P[x, y1] + P[x, y2])
P[x, y1] · (P[y1] + P[y2])
+P[x, y2] · log2
P[y2] · (P[x, y1] + P[x, y2])
P[x, y2] · (P[y1] + P[y2]) .
Since log2 x ≤ x−1ln 2 , we get
H(X |Yi )− H(X |Yi+1) ≤ 1ln 2
∑
x∈X
P[x, y1] ·
(
P[y1] · (P[x, y1] + P[x, y2])
P[x, y1] · (P[y1] + P[y2]) − 1
)
+P[x, y2] ·
(
P[y2] · (P[x, y1] + P[x, y2])
P[x, y2] · (P[y1] + P[y2]) − 1
)
≤ P[y1]
ln 2
·
(∑
x∈X P[x, y1] +
∑
x∈X P[x, y2]
P[y1] + P[y2] − 1
)
−P[y2]
ln 2
·
(∑
x∈X P[x, y1] +
∑
x∈X P[x, y2]
P[y1] + P[y2] − 1
)
= 0.
This proves the claim. 
Note that if X dominates X ′, we have
I (X; Y |Z) = H(Y |Z)− H(X |Y, Z)
≥ H(Y |Z)− H(X ′|Y, Z) = I (X ′; Y |Z). 
We use the general definition of Shannon’s entropy to gain a measure for information provided by a knowledge
base and a communication string.
Definition 6. Let (G,K) be an advised network, let P be a protocol solving a communication problem on (G,K),
and let Pi ∈ V (G). The knowledge base Ki defines the discrete random variable X with values in Gn . Note that
P(X = G ′|KiP) > 0 iff G ′ ∈ G[KiP]. The uncertainty about G of Pi is defined by
H(X|KiP).
We call H(X |KiP) the network entropy according to Pi ,K, and P .
The uncertainty of Pi about the network topology after a run of P is defined by H(X |CiKiP). Since the
communication string Ci depends on the network topology, Ci is a random variable itself.
We sayK covers the mutual information of P iff
I (X;Ci |KiP) = 0
for all i . The set cov(P) is defined as the set of all knowledge bases that cover the mutual information of P .
Since we want to solve A2A, we consider only networks with a finite number of PNs.
Note that, using this definition, we do not restrict the computational power of a PN that tries to gain some knowledge
about the network from the communication sequence. For easier notation, we write H(G|KiP) instead of H(X |KiP)
and I (G;Ci |KiP) instead of I (X;Ci |KiP). We assume that the distribution of X is unknown to Pi . Thus, all
networks in G[Ki ] are indistinguishable for Pi . Therefore, we treat them equally, i.e. P(Gi = G ′|Ki ) = 1|G[Ki ]|
for all G ′ ∈ G[Ki ]. Hence, H(G|KiP) = log(|G[KiP]|) is the network entropy according to Pi , K, and P .
Our aim is to find a protocol P and a knowledge base generator T such that P solves a given communication
problem on (G, T (G)) = (G,K) for all networks G and
K ∈ cov(P), i.e. I (G;Ci |KiP) = 0 for all i .
Hence, the protocol P preserves the secret of topology of G with respect to K. If G is known to all PNs, then any
protocol that solves A2A fulfills this condition. Since we address the network as the subject of secrecy, we want to
maximize the network entropy of the PNs. Therefore, the knowledge provided to a PN has to be as small as possible.
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We analyze protocols P that solve a communication problem on every advised network, and every PN runs the
same protocol, i.e. every PN has the same knowledge about the code of the executed protocol. Thus, for legibility, we
usually omit P when talking about probability, entropy, and mutual information.
3. Lower bounds on the knowledge to solve A2A
In the following we want to present some properties that must be fulfilled by a knowledge base to cover the mutual
information of a protocol solving A2A.
3.1. Inherent knowledge
The protocol P has to solve A2A on all networks. In particular, P solves A2A on (G, T (G)), where G is a tree.
Recall that we do not limit the computational power of the PNs. On a tree for any pair Pi , Pj and any PN Pk on
the path from Pi to Pj , the PN Pk receives all messages sent from Pi to Pj . Thus, Pk is able to extract the same
information from these messages as Pj . Since each target PN Pj is able to identify the sender Pi of a message Mi, j
addressed to it, every PN is able to decide which PN is the destination and which is the sender. Therefore, we assume
in the following that the sender and receiver are given in the header of a message. To solve A2A, the PN Pj has to be
reachable from all other PNs. Hence, we can conclude that each Ki has to include the knowledge that G is connected,
the size of G, the ID i of Pi , and a list of all other used IDs. We call this knowledge the inherent knowledge.
If the knowledge base of an advised network only contains inherent knowledge, then a protocol that solves A2A
for all connected networks and that preserves the secret of topology has to broadcast any message. But if messages
are broadcast in 2-connected components, some PNs gain the knowledge that two of its neighbors belong to the
same 2-connected component by receiving the message at least twice. Note that this is not deducible from inherent
knowledge.
To minimize the partial knowledge about the network, communication is performed using a selective broadcast
(respectively via selected links). Therefore, we also add the knowledge about the links used by P to the inherent
knowledge defined above. We assume that these links can be addressed by Pi as e1, . . . , ek . This motivates the use
of routing tables as knowledge bases. In Section 4 we present a protocol that solves A2A by addressing explicit
neighbors. This protocol can easily be transformed into a protocol that only uses incident links without knowledge of
the adjacent PNs. Hence, a PN does not need to know the IDs of its neighbors.
A knowledge base that consists only of the inherent knowledge of a network G is denoted byKG .
3.2. Monotone offset function
If messages travel through a synchronous network, they are delayed at least one round by every PN that they pass.
Hence, the round when a message is received depends on the delay (respectively on the number of PNs passed). We
will show that there must be some information about the distances included in the knowledge base to communicate in
the network without revealing additional knowledge.
Definition 7. Let (G,K) be an advised network and P be a communication protocol that solves A2A on (G,K). A
function ∆ : V × V → N is called the monotone offset function (MOF) for (G,K) with P iff, for all processing
nodes Pi 6= Pj ∈ V , for all paths piG(Pi , Pj ) = {v0, . . . , vk} that are used by P , and for all l ∈ [0, k−1], it holds that
∆(Pi , vl) < ∆(Pi , vl+1).
A function ∆ is called an MOF for (T ,P,Ki ) iff, for all G ∈ G[Ki ] with Ki ∈ T (G), it holds that ∆ is an MOF
for (G, T (G)).
Lemma 3. Let (G,K) be an advised network. Let ∆ be an MOF for (G,K) and for a protocol P that solves A2A on
(G,K). If the partial function ∆(·, Pi ) is locally deducible for every PN Pi from the knowledge base Ki , then there
exists a communication protocol P ′ such that P ′ solves A2A on (G,K) and the execution of P ′ does not reveal more
information about the distances in G than given by ∆.
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Proof. Let piG(Pi , Pj ) be a path from Pi to Pj in G and let ∆ be a function fulfilling the property of Definition 7
according to piG(Pi , Pj ) = v0, . . . , vk with v0 = Pi and vk = Pj . Now, we will design a deterministic protocol P ′
using∆. If a message M has to be sent from Pi to Pj , then v0 delays M for∆(v0, v0) rounds, and sends M to v1. For
l ∈ [1, k−1], vl receives M after∆(v0, vl−1)+1 rounds, it delays M for∆(v0, vl)−∆(v0, vl−1)−1 ≥ 0 rounds and
sends M to vl+1. The value ∆(v0, vl−1) can be computed by vl by investigating the communication string. The delay
of M equals the values given by ∆ for all pairs of PNs. Thus, the delay and an upper bound of the distance between
two PNs is given by ∆. Hence, the execution of P ′ does not reveal more information about the distances as given by
∆. 
If no MOF is given, then sending a message M from Pi to Pj in the network provides additional information about
the network topology.
Theorem 1. Let T be a knowledge base generator and P a communication protocol that solves A2A on (G, T (G))
for every connected network G. If there exists Ki , where Ki is the local knowledge base of PN Pi in T (G) for some
connected networks G such that Pi cannot deduce a MOF for (T ,P,Ki ) from Ki , then T (G) 6∈ cov(P).
To prove this theorem, we show that if noMOF is known, then by examining the communication rounds determined
by P either some networks can be excluded, i.e. G[Ki ] \ G[Ki ,Ci ] 6= ∅, or an MOF can be constructed. Hence, the
knowledge base in an advised network needs to contain consistent information about the distances or the delay of
messages in the network.
Proof. For the contrary, assume that there exists a triple (T ,P,Ki ) such that Pi cannot deduce anMOF for (T ,P,Ki )
from Ki and T (G) = K ∈ cov(P) for all G. Let G be a connected network such that Ki is the local knowledge base
of Pi in T (G). Let d j,i : N −→ 2G[Ki ] be a mapping from the delay δ of a message traveling in (G, T (G)) from Pj
to Pi . Finally, let G[Ki , δ] denote the set of all networks in G[Ki ] for which a message sent from Pj to Pi is delayed
by δ.
Assume that there exists at least one PN Pj and two delays δa 6= δb such that d j,i (δa), d j,i (δb) 6= ∅, and there exists
a network G ′ ∈ (d j,i (δa) ∪ d j,i (δb)) \ (d j,i (δa) ∩ d j,i (δb)). W.l.o.g. assume that G ′ ∈ d j,i (δa). Thus, if Pi observes
that a message that was sent from Pj to Pi is delayed by δb rounds, Pi can deduce that the underlying network is
unequal to G ′. Hence, I (G; δb|KiP) > 0, i.e. K 6∈ cov(P).
If for all processing nodes Pj 6= Pi there exists a delay δ j,i with d j,i (k) = ∅ for all k < δ j,i and either
d j,i (k) = d j,i (δ j,i ) or d j,i (k) = ∅ for all k ≥ δ j,i , then the function ∆( j, i) = δ j,i is a monotone offset function
for (G, T (G)) for (T ,P,Ki ). The property of Definition 7 follows from the fact that, with growing distance to the
sender, the delay must be strongly increasing monotonically. Note that ∆ is determined by Ki , hence if K ∈ cov(P)
then ∆ is deducible from K— a contradiction. 
4. Routing tables
Routing tables are some kind of knowledge bases that include inherent knowledge and sufficient knowledge about
distances in the network. Furthermore, routing in most networks as well as in the Internet is done using routing tables.
Thus, we want to analyze the properties of a routing table such that A2A is possible and one cannot reveal additional
knowledge about the network. For easier notation, we assume that every PN knows its neighborhood. The functions
discussed in the following, i.e. nextG and lastG , depend on the neighbor from which a message is received. Note that
we can easily modify this function such that they depend only on the links used, i.e. not on the ID of the explicit
neighbors.
If a message is received by a PN, the routing table provides the information for which neighbors the message has
to be sent to next. These neighbors may depend on the sender and the receiver of the message.
Definition 8. Let (G,K) be an advised network where K includes inherent knowledge. K fulfills the weak routing
table property (WRTP) on G if, for all PNs Ps and Pt ∈ V (G), it holds that:
1. nextG(Pi , ·, ·) is computable for every Pi by using Ki ;
2. there exists a path piG(Ps, Pt ) = P0, . . . , Pk with P0 = Ps and Pk = Pt such that Pi+1 ∈ nextG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) for all
i < k;
3. every Pi receives a message sent from Ps to Pt by using nextG at most once, i.e. |{Pj |Pi ∈ nextG(Pj , Ps, Pt )}| ≤ 1.
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Fig. 2. Network from the proof of Theorem 2.
K fulfills the consistent routing table property (CRTP) on G, ifK fulfills WRTP and for the function nextG it holds
that: for every PN Pt , the network STG,i := (V (G), E ′) is a spanning tree of G, where E ′ = {{Pi , Pj } | ∃Ps : Pj ∈
nextG(Pi , Ps, Pt )}.
K fulfills the strong routing table property (SRTP) on G if K fulfills CRTP and, for every PN Pt , the networks
STG,t are identical. We denote the single spanning tree as STG .
If a knowledge base K fulfills a property B, e.g. WRTP, CRTP, SRTP, then we call K a B knowledge base.
The WRTP property defines for all sender–receiver pairs a tree connecting both PNs. If the knowledge base fulfills
CRTP, then the nextG-function induces a spanning tree of the network for every receiving PN Pt . The SRTP property
guarantees that the knowledge base provides information about a single spanning tree. Thus, the inverse of the nextG-
function can be computed for every PN. In the following we call the inverse function lastG with lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) = Pj
if Pi ∈ nextG(Pj , Ps, Pt ) for any Pi , Ps, Pt . By a counter-example we can show that:
Theorem 2. There exist advised networks (G,K) that fulfill CRTP such that, for all communication protocols P that
solve A2A on G, it holds that K 6∈ cov(P).
Proof. Let G be the network illustrated in Fig. 2. LetK consist of inherent knowledge and the function nextG , defined
as follows: nextG(Ps, Pi , P1) = P2 and nextG(Ps, Pi , Pt ) = P3 for Pi ∈ {P0, Ps}; nextG(P2, Pi , P1) = P1 for
Pi ∈ {P0, Ps, P2}, nextG(P1, Pi , Pj ) = P3 for Pi ∈ {P1, Pt } and Pj ∈ {P0, Ps, P2, P3}. This nextG-function can
easily be completed to fulfill CRTP.
Since nextG(Ps, Ps, P1) = P2, nextG(P2, Ps, P1) = P1, nextG(Ps, Ps, Pt ) = P3 and, thus, nextG(P3, Ps, P1) =
P1, it holds that nextG does not define a spanning tree of G. Hence, K does not fulfill SRTP. Assume P to solve A2A
on the advised network (G,K) with K ∈ cov(P). Furthermore, let Ps send a message M to P1. P1 receives M from
P2. If Ps sends a message M ′ to Pt , the PN P1 receives M ′ from P3. Thus, P1 learns that P1, P2, P3 belong to the
same 2-connected component in G and K 6∈ cov(P)— a contradiction. 
If K fulfills SRTP, the function lastG provides each PN Pi with the size, i.e. the number of nodes of the subtrees
corresponding to each neighbor Pj with respect to nextG :
sizeST(Pi , Pj ) := max
Pt∈V (G)
|{Ps | lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) = Pj }|.
Note that we can easily compute the function sizeST(Pi , Pj ) of a pair Pi , Pj , even if Pj 6∈ nbh(Pi ), such that
sizeST(Pi , Pj ) is the number of nodes reachable from Pj in STG without passing Pi .
The basic idea for a protocol P with a database K ∈ cov(P), where K fulfills SRTP, is to delay a message for an
appropriate amount of time. If a PN Pi has to forward a message M to a neighbor Pj due to nextG , then Pi delays
M according to the sizes of the subtree including Pi , as seen from Pj . One can show that Pj does not get further
information about the network; in particular, Pj gets no additional information about the distance between nodes.
Only the sizes of subtrees are revealed, but these are already given by K j . Algorithm 1 describes a protocol that
realizes one-to-one communication. The procedure can easily be modified to solve A2A.
Theorem 3. Let (G,K) be an advised network where K fulfills SRTP. Then, there exists a protocol P that solves A2A
with K ∈ cov(P).
Proof. Let P be the protocol that uses Algorithm 1 for every pair of PNs Ps, Pt . Let (G,K) be an advised network
and letK fulfill SRTP. P solves A2A on (G,K) if nextG(Pi , ·, ·) and lastG(Pi , ·, ·) are computable fromKi for all Pi .
M. Hinkelmann, A. Jakoby / Theoretical Computer Science 384 (2007) 184–200 193
Algorithm 1 Sending a message M from Ps to Pt
Input: message M , sending PN Ps , receiving PN Pt , nextG , lastG
1: for all Pi ∈ V (G) do in parallel
2: if Pi 6= Ps then receive M end if
3: if Pi = Ps then
4: for all Pj ∈ nextG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) do in parallel
5: dPj ←
∑
Pk∈nbh(Pi )\{Pj } sizeST(Pi , Pk)
6: end for
7: else if Pi 6∈ {Ps, Pt } then
8: for all Pj ∈ nextG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) do in parallel
9: dPj ←−sizeST(Pi , lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ))+
∑
Pk∈nbh(Pi )\{Pj } sizeST(Pi , Pk)
10: end for
11: end if
12: if Pi 6= Pt then delay M for dPj rounds, send M to Pj end if
13: end for
Since messages are routed along the links of the spanning tree induced by the nextG-function, the protocol ensures for
each pair of sending and receiving PNs that the message reaches the receiver.
Every PN Pi can compute the size of the subtrees of STG corresponding to the neighbors of Pi from the function
lastG . Furthermore, Pi knows that there exists a path in G from Ps to Pt including Pi if lastG(Pi , Pt , Ps) and
lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) are different and defined.
Performing P , the processing nodes forward the message M to neighbors that are defined by the nextG-function.
Thus, by the weak routing table property, every processing node receives M at most once and M is received from
lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ).
By complete induction over the steps of the protocol, we proof that the delay of a message M is equal to the size
of the subtree from which M is received.
Ps sends M to all Pj ∈ nextG(Ps, Ps, Pt ) and delays M for
dPj =
∑
Pk∈nbh(Ps )\{Pj }
sizeST(Ps, Pk) = sizeST(Pj , Ps)− 1
rounds. Pj receives M in the next round. Assume that, if Pi receives the message M traveling from Ps to Pt , then the
number of rounds that M needs to reach Pi is given by sizeST(Pi , lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt )). Let M be a message traveling
from Ps to Pt via Pi and Pi+1 6= Ps . Assume that nextG(Pi , Ps, Pt ) 3 Pi+1. After M is received by Pi , the PN Pi
delays M for
dPi+1 = −sizeST(Pi , lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ))+
∑
Pk∈nbh(Pi )\{Pi+1}
sizeST(Pi , Pk)
rounds. Pi+1 receives M in the next round. By the induction hypothesis, the message needs
1+ dPi+1 + sizeST(Pi , lastG(Pi , Ps, Pt ))
rounds to reach Pi . Since K fulfills SRTP and M is routed along the links of the underlying spanning tree, it follows
that the total delay is sizeST(Pi+1, Ps).
Thus, all processing nodes know from their knowledge bases and from the protocol P how long it takes for a
message to arrive, from which node a message is received and to what node a message has to be sent, and finally
how long it will take to reach the receiver. As we ignore the body of a message and we allow messages to be received
simultaneously, no other information is extractable by a processing node Pi from the communication string Ci . Hence,
K ∈ cov(P). 
5. Generating routing table-like knowledge bases
So far, we have analyzed advised networks with given knowledge bases. When real communication networks are
set up, a PN gets the knowledge about its environment from a higher authority: the network administrator plugs in the
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wires, and the DHCP-Server answers a broadcast and informs the node about its IP-address and the gateway to the
Internet. Since we want to keep the network topology secret. A higher authority with a global view on the network
should be avoided. Now, we are going to analyze whether the PNs are able to build up SRTP fulfilling routing tables
from inherent knowledge and knowledge about their neighborhood by exchanging some messages. In this scenario it
is our goal to find a protocol such that the communication sequence of a PN must not give more knowledge about the
network than is deducible from the constructed knowledge base.
The networks considered so far have been static. In the following we focus on networks that are dynamic. These
are inspired by ad hoc networks. We concentrate on dynamic networks where single PNs or networks of PNs are
added to a given network. This means that single PNs or communication networks may appear and be connected to
the existing network by adding links. The connection is made by updating the nbh-function in the knowledge bases
and combining those. More formally, in the beginning, a PN Pi uses K0i . In the case that something occasionally
changes, some of the PNs get updated knowledge bases. Thus, at round T , PN Pi is allowed to use all knowledge
bases in {K ji | j ∈ [0, T ]}. Therefore, we assume that KTi includes the contents of all prior knowledge bases. We
deal with the question whether the routing tables KT+1i can be generated without revealing more knowledge about the
network by analyzing the communication that occurs during the generation of the modified routing tables than given
by KT+1i . Since we will discuss a single step of the update problem in the following, we will omit the superscript T .
If the nbh-function is updated, the PNs do not have any information about the settings of the SRTP conforming
functions nextG and lastG of the added PNs. Thus, for generating a SRTP fulfilling knowledge base of the combined
network, the PNs have to exchange some knowledge, i.e. communication in the network is necessary. In the following
we will show that adding single nodes to a network can be handled without revealing more knowledge through the
communication than one can deduce from the resulting knowledge base.
Definition 9. Let B be a property that characterizes a set of knowledge bases, e.g. SRTP. A protocol P is called a B
knowledge base generator if, for every advised network (G,KG), the protocol P generates a B fulfilling knowledge
base for G.
For a protocol P running on advised networks (G,KG), let TP be the knowledge base generator that generates the
local knowledge bases Ki that are determined by the inherent knowledge of Pi in V (G), the protocol code P , and the
communication sequence of Pi when running P on (G,KG). We call a B knowledge base generator P minimal if TP
is minimal for all knowledge base generators T ′ that generate B fulfilling knowledge bases.
Regard that the protocol that generates a knowledge base may reveal more knowledge about the network topology
than can be computed from the local knowledge bases.
Definition 10. Let (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) be two node disjoint advised networks. (G,K) is called the combined
network of (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) iff G = (V (G ′)∪V (G ′′), E(G ′)∪ E(G ′′)∪ E) for some links E ⊆ {{Pi , Pj }|Pi ∈
V (G ′), Pj ∈ V (G ′′)}. For each PN Pi ∈ V (G ′), the knowledge baseKi consists ofK′i , the size of G, and the modified
neighborhood function of Pi in G. Analogously, the knowledge base for a processing node in V (G ′′) is modified.
If we investigate a B knowledge base generator P for a property B that runs on a combined network (G ′,K′) and
(G ′′,K′′), then we assume that the resulting knowledge base includes the partial knowledge K′ (respectively K′′). In
the following we will focus on the question whether there exists a minimal SRTP knowledge base generator such that
the generated knowledge base also contains the local knowledge of K′ and K′′ of the initial advised networks. We call
such a protocol a minimal (SRTP,K′,K′′)-knowledge base generator.
If we add a single PN to an existing network (see Fig. 3), the new PN can select one of its neighbors to be its
exclusive neighbor in the nextG-tree. Using a protocol analogously to Algorithm 1, we can update the knowledge
bases of the remaining PNs. Hence, we get:
Lemma 4. Let (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) be two disjoint advised networks where K′,K′′ fulfill SRTP. If the network G ′′
consists of a single PN, then there exists a protocol P that is a minimal (SRTP, K′,K′′)-knowledge base generator.
Proof. Let Pnew be the processing node of G ′′. The knowledge baseKnew of the combined network provides Pnew and
all Pi ∈ nbh(Pnew) with the added link {Pi , Pnew}. Since K′ fulfills SRTP, every processing node in V (G) \ {Pnew}
is included in a tree defined by nextG . In the first step of P the processing node Pnew selects one of its neighbors Pi
at random. For all Ps, Pt ∈ V (G) \ {Pnew} define nextG(Pnew, Pnew, Pt ) = Pi and lastG(Pnew, Ps, Pnew) = Pi . The
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Fig. 3. Appending P3 to the network.
node Pnew sends a message to Pi indicating that nextG(Pi , Ps, Pnew) = Pnew and lastG(Pi , Pnew, Pt ) = Pnew for all
Ps, Pt ∈ V (G) \ {Pnew}.
To update the nextG and lastG functions of the remaining processing nodes, we iterate the following procedure
during flooding the spanning tree given by the nextG function of K′:
– Let Pj be the processing node that has updated its knowledge base in the last step and let Pk be the processing
node that has sent the update message to Pj . Then, Pj sends an update message to all neighbors P` ∈⋃
t nextG(Pj , Pk, Pt ). To hide distances, the updated messages are delayed analogously to our strategy used in
Algorithm 1.
– Let P` be a processing node that has received an update message from Pj in the last step. Then, P` updates
nextG(P`, Ps, Pnew) = Pj and also lastG(P`, Pnew, Pt ) = Pj for all Ps, Pt that are reachable from Pj by passing
through P` in STG .
On completion of P , the knowledge bases of all processing nodes are up to date and the knowledge base K˜ generated
by P fulfills SRTP. The messages sent when performing P are delayed according to Algorithm 1. Thus, the processing
nodes are not able to derive more about the network topology from the messages than the subtree sizes of the
underlying spanning tree and what is included in the body of the messages.
The settings of nextG and lastG and the conditions under which the predecessor sent the update message can be
extracted directly out of the knowledge base K˜. Thus, K˜ ∈ cov(P), P updates nextG and lastG only, and P does not
reveal more about the network than one can deduce from K. Furthermore, K˜ only contains the inherent knowledge,
the nextG-, the lastG-function and the functions given byK′ (respectivelyK′′). Hence, P is a minimal (SRTP,K′,K′′)-
knowledge base generator. 
5.1. Combining networks
Let (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) be two advised networks, both of size at least two.
In the following we will show that there exists no minimal (SRTP, K′,K′′)-knowledge base generator for the
combination of advised networks (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) for every possible choice of connecting links of G ′ and G ′′.
Theorem 4. There does not exist a minimal (SRTP, K′,K′′)-knowledge base generator P for every pair of advised
networks (G ′,K′), (G ′′,K′′) and every combination of G ′ and G ′′ where all knowledge bases fulfill SRTP.
Proof. Let (G ′,K′) and (G ′′,K′′) be two advised networks. (G,K) denotes the combined network. G ′ and G ′′ each
consist of two PNs. Fig. 4 illustrates some examples for G denoted by G1, . . . ,G15. In the images, G ′ consists of the
two nodes on the left-hand side and G ′′ consists of the remaining nodes. The PNs of G ′ are denoted P1 and P2, where
P1 is drawn in the upper left corner. The graph in the first column illustrates the subgraph of G that can be observed
by the distinguished PN (denoted by the solid dot) by analyzing its local knowledge base. We denote the knowledge
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Fig. 4. Resulting knowledge bases and the corresponding possible networks of the example of Theorem 4.
base in row i as KBi . In the remaining columns we give all networks G that may occur for the knowledge base in the
same row. Rows 1–19 consider P1 as the distinguished PN, and the last three rows consider P2. A solid line in the
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knowledge base KBi means that the distinguished PN knows that the corresponding link is part of the spanning tree
STG induced by the nextG-function of K. If the line is dotted, the link exists, but it is not part of STG . In total, there
are 15 possibilities for G. Assume that the knowledge bases K′ does not include any information about G ′′ and that
K′′ does not include any information about G ′. Let P be a communication protocol that generates the knowledge base
of the combined network (G,K) such that K fulfills SRTP. Assume that K ∈ cov(P). Since P and K′ are fixed, we
omit them in the probabilities.
Assume that G = G4. Then, either KB1, KB2 or KB3 has to be the resulting knowledge base of P1 after performing
P . Thus, there exists j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with P(KB j ) > 0.
Assume that the protocol P is a minimal (SRTP, K′, K′′)-knowledge base generator. Then, the distinguished PN
cannot distinguish between possible networks and treats all possible networks equally likely. There are four possible
networks given KB j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, for all i ∈ [1, 4] it holds that
P(Gi |KB j ) = 14 and P(Gi ,KB j ) = 14 · P(KB j ).
In total, there exist 15 networks G after the combination process. Therefore,
P(Gi ) = 115 and P(Gi ,KB j ) = 115 · P(KB j |Gi ).
Thus, P(KB j |Gi ) can be described independently of Gi for i ∈ [1, 4]:
P(KB j |Gi ) = 154 · P(KB j ).
This implies that, for i, l ∈ [1, 4] and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it holds that
P(KB j |Gi ) = P(KB j |Gl).
Recall that if G4 occurs, then only KB1, KB2 or KB3 may be the resulting knowledge base of P for P1. Thus,∑
j∈{1,2,3}
P(KB j |G4) = 1 and therefore,
∑
j∈{1,2,3}
P(KB j |G1) = 1.
In particular, for j 6∈ {1, 2, 3} it holds that
P(KB j |G4) = P(KB j |G1) = 0.
Analogously to our analysis above, we can show for P2 that KB20,KB21,KB22 are the only possible knowledge bases
for P2 if G13 occurs. Hence,∑
i
P(KBi |G13) =
∑
i∈{20,21,22}
P(KBi |G13) = 1
and P(KB j |G1) = 0 for all j 6∈ {20, 21, 22}. Thus,
P(KB j |G4) = P(KB j |G1) = 0
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}— a contradiction.
Hence, running P , we can generate a knowledge base K by collecting all communication sequences and inserting
the protocol P into the knowledge base. Since P is an SRTP knowledge base generator, we can reduce an SRTP
knowledge base for G to K. Thus, K is an SRTP fulfilling knowledge base. On the other hand, the analysis above
implies that there exists j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i ∈ [1, 4] such that
P(KB j ) > 0 and P(Gi |KB j ) 6= 14 .
We can conclude that P is not a minimal (SRTP, K′,K′′)-knowledge base generator. 
5.2. Static networks
Static networks are fixed from the beginning. They never change their shape. In contrast to dynamic networks, a
protocol P that generates a SRTP fulfilling knowledge base cannot resort to the addition of one PN as in Lemma 4. In
static networks we cannot use the sequence in which the PNs are included in the network.
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Fig. 5. Network from the proof of Theorem 5. P1 is unsure about the link {P2, P3} if event χ occurs.
The question whether knowledge bases can be generated out of inherent knowledge in the static case also influences
the dynamic case. When a communication network is set up, it usually consists of several PNs. Thus, most dynamic
networks originate from a static basis. Such a basis has also to be provided with a knowledge base that allows all-to-all
communication.
Theorem 5. There does not exist a communication protocol P that is a minimal SRTP knowledge base generator for
every network G, i.e. the protocol P generates a minimal SRTP knowledge base K ∈ cov(P).
To prove this theorem we analyze the network entropy of the network given in Fig. 5. One can show that either P1
learns something about the remaining links incident to P2 or P2 learns something about the remaining links incident
to P1.
Proof. For the contrary, assume that there exists a minimal SRTP knowledge base generator P for every network G.
Let G be the communication network illustrated in Fig. 5 with {P1, P2} ∈ E(G). Recalling that P1 has only partial
knowledge about the edges incident to P2, we assume that G is a uniformly distributed random variable where its
domain is given by all networks that are consistent with Ki , i.e. all networks G where P may generate the local
knowledge base Ki for Pi .
Let Ei be the random variable that denotes the neighborhood of Pi in G without the link {P1, P2}, i.e. Ei = 1 if
{Pi , P3} ∈ E(G) and Ei = 0 otherwise. Let χ denote the event that ‘nextG(P1, P3, P2) = P2 on completion of P’,
i.e. that the nextG function of the data base K1 is given by nextG(P1, P3, P2) = P2. Note that the complementary
event χ is given by ‘nextG(P1, P3, P2) 6= P2 on completion of P’. For easier notion we write χ ∈ Ki if the event χ
occurs.
In the following we assume that event E1 = 1 occurs. We denote the complete network by∆ and the network with
links {P1, P2} and {P1, P3} by Λ.
Let C1 be the random variable that describes the communication string seen by P1 during the execution of P on G.
Note that G dominates E2. Therefore, it follows from Lemma 1 that
I (G;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki ) ≥ I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki ).
Hence, it is sufficient to prove that
I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki ) > 0. (1)
Let {c1, c2, . . .} denote the domain of C1, i.e. the set of all possible communication strings that may be seen by
P1. Let µΛ be the probability distribution of C1 on the network G with E(G) = {{P1, P2}, {P1, P3}}, and let µ∆ be
the probability distribution on the complete network. Finally, let µ denote the probability distribution of C1, if the
network is randomly chosen from the domain {Λ,∆}, i.e. for all ci ∈ dom(Ci )
µΛ(ci ) = P(C1 = ci | E(G) = {{P1, P2}, {P1, P3}})
µ∆(ci ) = P(C1 = ci | E(G) = {{P1, P2}, {P1, P3}, {P2, P3}})
µ(ci ) = µΛ(ci )+ µ∆(ci )2 .
Ifµ∆ ≡ µΛ, then χ occurs with probability 1 if E1 = 1. Thus, the event ‘nextG(P2, P3, P1) = P1 on completion of
P’ occurs with probability 0. In this case we substitute P1 with P2, C1 with C2, and E1 with E2. After this substitution
M. Hinkelmann, A. Jakoby / Theoretical Computer Science 384 (2007) 184–200 199
the corresponding distributions µ′∆ and µ
′
Λ are unequal. Recall that, if two networks are indistinguishable for a PN,
we assume that they occur with the same probability. It holds that
I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki ) = H(C1|E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki )− H(C1|E2, E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki )
= −
∑
ci
(
µ(ci ) · log(µ(ci ))− µ∆(ci ) · log(µ∆(ci ))+ µΛ(ci ) · log(µΛ(ci ))2
)
= −1
2
∑
ci
((µΛ(ci )+ µ∆(ci )) · log(µ(ci ))
−µ∆(ci ) · log(µ∆(ci ))− µΛ(ci ) · log(µΛ(ci )))
= −1
2
∑
ci
(
µΛ(ci ) · log
(
µ(ci )
µΛ(ci )
)
+ µ∆(ci ) · log
(
µ(ci )
µ∆(ci )
))
= −1
2
∑
ci
(
µΛ(ci ) ·
(
log
(
µ∆(ci )+ µΛ(ci )
µΛ(ci )
)
− 1
)
+µ∆(ci ) ·
(
log
(
µ∆(ci )+ µΛ(ci )
µ∆(ci )
)
− 1
))
.
Note that a division by 0 may occur in one of the preceding logarithms. In such a case we can assume that the
corresponding term is zero, since 0 log(c/0) is originally given by 0 log(c)− 0 log(0) = 0.
One can easily see that I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ Ki ) = 0 if µ∆ ≡ µΛ. To prove that I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈
Ki ) > 0 if µ∆ 6≡ µΛ, we show that every summand in the last equation above is at most 0 and strictly lower than 0
for ci with µ∆(ci ) 6= µΛ(ci ). For easier notion we skip ci in the following formula. Let
h := µΛ ·
(
log
(
µ∆ + µΛ
µΛ
)
− 1
)
+ µ∆ ·
(
log
(
µ∆ + µΛ
µ∆
)
− 1
)
.
Let us assume that µ∆ is fixed by some arbitrary value and assume that µΛ < µ∆. By analyzing the derivation over
µΛ of h, one can see that h increases strictly monotonically for µΛ < µ∆ and decreases strictly monotonically for
µΛ > µ∆:
dh
dµΛ
=
(
log
(
µ∆ + µΛ
µΛ
)
− 1
)
+ µΛ
ln 2
· 1
µ∆+µΛ
µΛ
·
(
−µ∆
µ2Λ
)
+ µ∆
ln 2
· 1
µ∆+µΛ
µ∆
· 1
µ∆
=
(
log
(
µ∆ + µΛ
µΛ
)
− 1
)
− µ∆
ln 2
· 1
µ∆ + µΛ +
µ∆
ln 2
· 1
µ∆ + µΛ
= log
(
µ∆ + µΛ
µΛ
)
− 1.
Hence, I (E2;C1 | E1 = 1, χ ∈ K1) > 0 if µ∆ 6= µΛ and K1 is a SRTP fulfilling knowledge base. If µ∆ = µΛ, then
we can show analogously that I (E1;C2 | E2 = 1, χ ∈ K2) > 0. Thus K 6∈ cov(P)— a contradiction. 
6. Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we have investigated the secrecy of network topology. Therefore, we have introduced the model of
advised networks. The available knowledge of the PNs about the network is represented by their knowledge bases. An
information theoretic metric called network entropy is introduced. We have investigated some knowledge bases with
routing table properties and studied whether these are sufficient to ensure the privacy of the network. For knowledge
bases that fulfill the strong routing table property, a protocol is presented that solves the all-to-all communication
problem. This protocol does not reveal additional information about the network topology. Finally, we have dealt with
the question whether the knowledge bases can be generated from inherent knowledge. More precisely, we have studied
whether a routing table that only consists of SRTP functions can be computed if two or more dynamic networks are
combined. We have shown that there does not exist a protocol that generates the desired knowledge bases without
allowing the PNs to gain more information about the topology than allowed. The only exception is the case where
single nodes are added in dynamic environments.
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Many problems remain open. We want to minimize the knowledge given to the PNs. Do routing tables provide
minimal knowledge? And, if not, can we find a knowledge base such that the network entropy is maximal? The
dynamic networks used are inspired by ad hoc networks. We allowed that PNs and links are added. But, in ad hoc
networks, links and PNs may disappear or some links are inoperable from time to time. What property is sufficient
for a knowledge base in these environments? It also remains as an open problem whether asynchrony increases the
network uncertainty and, therefore, the security.
For further reading
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